Abstract / This article examines the impact of changes in market structures and accompanying policies in the diversity of Finnish television's programme content between 1993 and 2002. The analysis of the media policy and measurement of television supply indicate that, in Finland, the shift from a public service led situation to that of a mixed system with two public service and two commercial nationwide channels has not resulted in drastic changes in the diversity of television programming. Strict, but pragmatic, market-entry regulation has resulted in moderate competition, which appears to have favoured a substantial programme-type diversity and differentiation between the channels.
Diversity of content is commonly accepted as a founding principle in communication policy. Discussion on programme diversity as a performance goal has been particularly lively and relevant in the case of television, as is well documented, for example, by Blumler (1992) and Napoli (1999) . Accordingly, the principle of a wide range of programme options is typically included in national broadcasting legislation, and both public and commercial broadcasters have faced the requirement of diversity, set by the various regulatory bodies.
At the same time, a vast body of research has discussed whether and in what way changes in industry structure and competition affect programme diversity in television (see Litman, 1992; Napoli, 1999) . No doubt, industry structure does have an effect on diversity, but the relationship may be more complicated than is usually thought. In theory, the greater the number of channels available, the wider the range of offerings. However, as van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg (2001) have argued, it is possible that competition will stimulate diversity only if it remains below a certain threshold of intensity, while above that threshold, it will have a negative effect on diversity.
Communication policy provides several instruments for controlling the intensity of competition. In Europe, governments tend to have a dual strategy in broadcasting policy (Brants and De Bens, 2000) : public broadcasting companies still enjoy their privileged status but, by removing barriers to entry, governments have contributed to a flood of commercial services and a multiplication of available channels. Recently, the transition from analogue to digital terrestrial broadcasting in countries like the UK, Sweden, Spain, Australia and Finland has increased the channel-carrying capacity of the spectrum (Brown, 2002) . Generally, the new entrants have been expected to increase consumer choice and content diversity, as such, but this policy objective is also pursued via explicit content regulation, which in some cases is strict, in others vaguer.
The purpose of this article is to analyse the turn of communication policy and the television broadcasting market in Finland. Our research question is whether intensified competition, caused by liberalization and reregulation of broadcasting since 1993, has increased or decreased the diversity of programme content. First, we discuss the complicated relationship between competition, media policy and diversity. After describing and analysing the recent changes in the Finnish broadcasting policy and television scene, we use two parallel measures of diversity to determine the shifts in programming from 1993 to 2002. Finally, based on the empirical analyses, we discuss the complex trinity of media structures, regulation and programming in the context of moderate vs ruinous competition (van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg, 2001) in the small national television market of Finland.
Competition, Media Policy and Diversity

Dimensions of Diversity
What exactly constitutes diversity? The concept appears to be multidimensional and complicated, since it carries both empirical-quantitative and normativequalitative aspects. In commercial broadcasting, in particular, diversity is empirically and pragmatically connected with consumer choice of quantity and range, with diversity being fulfilled if the aggregate audiences and target groups are met. In contrast, for public broadcasters, particularly in Europe, diversity is a principled concept, a normative criterion of quality and a deliberately sought policy goal aiming at pluralism at various levels: in reflecting the various sectors of society, serving the multiplicity of audiences and supplying a wide range of choice in programme content (Blumler, 1991; Hellman, 2001; McQuail, 1992) .
Based on the conceptual analyses by McQuail (1992) and Napoli (1999) , we can distinguish between three different ways in which mass media can contribute to diversity: (1) by reflecting demographic differences in society, (2) by giving access to different ideas and points of view and (3) by offering a wide range of choice. Whether these standards are met can be analysed at three different levels: (1) source diversity (referring to media structure), (2) content diversity (referring, for example, to programme output) and (3) exposure diversity (referring to the actual use of media by the audience).
This article concentrates on diversity both in media structure and, in particular, media content. Media structure will be dealt with as far as market shares and competition intensity are concerned, while analysis of content is here limited to choice between different kinds of programmes, i.e. programme-type diversity supplied to the viewer. Focusing on programme-type diversity leaves several options for research. Here we follow the approach suggested by Hellman (2001) and concentrate on two separate aspects of it: breadth of programming and difference between channels. The first measure refers to the number and distribution of programme types available on a channel or across channels, and is called here diversity, whereas the second measure concerns the differences displayed by the channels in their programme-type output, and is called here dissimilarity. Diversity, as used here, represents 'open diversity ' (van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg, 2001) , or the probability of seeing different programme types, whereas dissimilarity is a relational concept that indicates the degree of difference, or lack of imitation, between the channels (cf. Dimmick and McDonald, 2001) .
Industry Structure and Programme-Type Diversity
If television broadcasting is analysed in terms of industrial structure, it represents a typical oligopoly industry in which a few large broadcasters share the market. A never-ending debate about whether competition in oligopoly markets produces diversity of product or excessive sameness remains unresolved. Media economists have made good arguments for two contradictory theories. While one claims that increasing competition tends to decrease the range of programme content, the other prescribes that industry turbulence, new entries, etc., encourage content diversity and product differentiation (Litman, 1992; Napoli, 1999) .
For example, Dominick and Pearce (1976) discovered that increased homogeneity of programming since 1953 in US network television coincided with increased network profitability, a pricing cartel and other syndromes of oligopolistic action. Litman's (1979) study explained the dramatically increased diversity of network television during the late 1970s with intensified competition, caused by the sudden success of ABC in the ratings. Both studies suggest that oligopoly causes diversity to decline, whereas competition tends to increase it.
If we look at results in the opposite direction, Lin (1995) expected that the new video media, such as cable, satellite and home video, would encourage diversity in network television. Contrary to expectation, she found a relatively constant level of programme-type diversity. Instead of increasing their range of offerings, Lin (1995: 24) explains, 'the networks countered this external threat by going "back to basics"'. Li and Chiang (2001) , studying the Taiwanese television market, and van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg (2001) , analysing the Dutch television scene, also discovered a clear negative relation between market competition and programme-type diversity. Interestingly, van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg suggest that competition and diversity are not linearly related. Whereas moderate competition, they claim, tends to encourage diversity, ruinous competition, with too many firms of equal size rivalling one another in a stagnant market, leads to excessive sameness in offerings.
As this brief overview demonstrates, the relationship between market competition/concentration and product diversity in broadcasting is undecided. As noted by Napoli (1999: 21) in his thorough review of recent studies, 'The research on the determinants of programme-type diversity suggests a possible relationship between source diversity and programme diversity. However, the evidence at this point is qualified, to say the least, and even contradictory. ' The conflicting results suggest that, as van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg (2001: 215) put it, when analysing the relationship between competition and diversity, the various 'assumptions, or "conjectures", of the firms' must be taken into account. These assumptions include factors like channel capacity, market size, financing method, etc. -as well as regulatory control (see, also, Collins et al., 1988; Litman, 1992; Owen and Wildman, 1992) . Together these factors guide the conduct and performance of the firms within the industry. Here particular interest is focused on the opportunities and significance of regulation.
Government Regulation and Programme-Type Diversity
Regulation is often understood in a restricted sense of the word, as a set of orders that stipulate directly media contents. In Europe, typical examples are quotas for European (or domestic) content, and quotas for independent productions, which both are based on the European Union Television Directive and have been implemented in national legislations (Collins, 1994) . In the US, regulatory instruments used include the Prime-Time Access Rules, Syndication Rules and the Consent Decrees that are enacted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate the market but which all indirectly affect programming (Litman, 1993) .
Government regulation of broadcasting plays a role in any marketplace. In spite of the increasingly efficient use of the broadcasting spectrum, the ultimate scarcity of radio frequencies explains part of the need for government intervention. Television's economic and cultural dominance explains the rest. According to Picard (1989) , regulation can be (1) technical (frequency allocation, technical standards), (2) structural (licensing, ownership rules), or (3) behavioural (content rules, advertising restrictions). In the European setting, at least two extra functions can be added: (4) financial (licence fee level) and (5) political (nominative power) regulation (Hellman, 1999) .
Broadcasting in a small market, such as Finland, where public and private broadcasters complement each other, differs radically from the US television landscape usually analysed in the relevant literature. In small, mixed-funding systems, in particular, media policy performs a multiple function. For example, in Finland the explicit role of the broadcasting policy is to achieve balance between public and private institutions and to guarantee economically fair and sound competitive conditions for both. Here the strongest instrument in the hands of government is licensing policy, through which policy-makers regulate the industry structure. We argue that in small markets with public and private operators competing, this structural regulation, i.e. political decisions about how many and which firms are privileged to enter the market, and on what conditions, prescribes programme diversity better than the economic terms stated by industry structure alone. Although programme content may be controlled by behavioural regulation, too, it always plays a secondary role compared to structural regulation.
This argument finds support from van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg (2001) . Building on industrial organization (IO) theory (e.g. Porter, 1985) , they contend that policy decisions can determine whether competition will be moderate or ruinous, thus directing both the strategic choices of companies, i.e. industry conduct, and programming, i.e. industry performance. While moderate competition, they suggest, encourages firms to pursue either cost leadership or differentiation strategies, thus calling for process and product innovations, and diversity, ruinous competition relies on price-competitive strategies, under which innovation tends to be absent, prices low and contents homogeneous. According to these authors, 'media competition policy should explicitly aim for moderate competition rather than competition as such, because moderate competition is the best guarantee for optimal diversity, reasonable prices, and adequate innovation' (van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg, 2001: 228) . They claim that 'moderate competition in broadcasting markets can be stimulated by shaping the appropriate structural conditions', and that market entry regulation as a part of media competition policy can provide for 'an appropriate instrument to create favourable conditions for moderate competition'. In other words, although industry structure (oligopoly) preconditions the conduct of the firms (strategic choices) and their performance (e.g. content diversity), media policy intervenes at all three levels. By shaping the industry structure and conditions of competition, policy-makers can direct the strategic choices by firms, thus affecting their performance and encouraging it to better serve public interest objectives, such as programme diversity.
The Changing Broadcasting Policy and Television Marketplace in Finland
Tradition of Structural Regulation
Finland is an interesting test case for studying the interplay between competition, media policy and programme output. Like many European countries, Finland also reassessed its broadcasting policy radically in the 1990s. Legislation and licensing practices were altered, and in the television sector, this 'managed liberalization' (Hellman, 1999) replaced the earlier public service monopoly by a new dual order.
A specific feature of the Finnish television market, dating back to its very start in 1957, was a tradition of pragmatism combined with structural regulation of the market. There never was a broadcasting monopoly based on law in Finland; instead, YLE's de facto monopoly was justified by market size. MTV Finland, operating under YLE's licence, had a monopoly on advertising time and rented airtime, providing for some 20 percent of programming on YLE's TV1 and TV2. For 35 years, commercial television in Finland was respected as a funding base of public broadcasting and, thus, was effectively protected from external competition. Accordingly, broadcasting licences were not granted to other parties (Hellman, 1999; Noam, 1991) . 1
Broadcasting Reform and Structural Reasoning
In the 1990s, Finland experienced a radical shift in broadcasting policy thinking -which, however, did not replace the basic philosophy of structural regulation. The reregulation that took place in four phases between 1993 and 1998 was composed of several reforms:
1. In January 1993, YLE and MTV Finland were allocated their own channels.
TV1 and TV2 were reserved for public service broadcasting (YLE1 and YLE2) while TV3 became a wholly commercial MTV3. 2. In August 1993, MTV Finland was awarded an operating licence of its own, whereas the new Act on YLE of December 1993 consolidated the new, enhanced status of YLE as the national public service broadcaster. 3. In order to avoid monopoly claims against MTV Finland, the government granted the licence for the fourth terrestrial channel in September 1996 to the privately owned Ruutunelonen (Channel Four Finland). 4. The Act of Television and Radio Broadcasting of 1998 opened the sector to new commercial entries, insofar as unoccupied frequencies are available and the interests of the public service YLE are not jeopardized.
The new policy was aimed explicitly at consolidating the existing industry structure and increasing competition only moderately. Although the idea of relieving the entry barriers was already widely accepted in 1993, MTV Finland was given an advantage of four years during which it had an opportunity to establish itself as an independent commercial broadcaster. Being a regular player of the Finnish broadcasting sector its de facto privilege was not even questioned. Similar structural logic was at work when time came to commence TV4. Instead of several domestic and foreign-based candidates, such as CLT from Luxembourg, the government chose to grant the licence to Channel Four Finland, a company majority-owned by the Finnish media conglomerate Sanoma Corporation (today SanomaWSOY Corporation). Although their programming promises were considered as well, the government's decision was based on the assessment of the appropriateness of the candidates, thus aiming for a manageable and viable industry structure. In its decision, the government reasoned that since 'established companies that have displayed their knowledge of the Finnish marketplace' owned Channel Four Finland, the choice 'best consolidates the structure of the Finnish media' (Liikenneministeriö, 1996: 17-18) , thus combining the interests of structural policy with cultural nationalism (see also Hellman, 1999) .
The Finnish government's digital policies, too, favoured explicitly the incumbent broadcasters when selecting the licensees in June 1999. As Brown (2003) has noticed, in deciding that five of the six new commercial licences would be for pay-TV rather than advertiser-supported channels, and by granting only two of them to new entrants, the government most obviously protected the income streams of MTV3 and Nelonen.
Broadcasting Legislation and Regulation of Industry Structure
Although modernizing the policy, the new broadcasting legislation of 1998 consolidated the long tradition of the structural approach. For example, in assessing licence applications, 'only the general lines of programme supply should be considered while the operator's right to decide the contents of its programming should not be intervened in detail', as the government proposed in the bill (Valtiopäivät, 1998) . Instead of programme contents, the appropriateness of the applicants would be assessed carefully on the basis of their respectability and solidity. This reflected an ideology of 'positive regulation' of the 'structures of programme production' earlier outlined in a strategy report commissioned by the Ministry of Transport and Communications (Mykkänen, 1995: 16-17) .
Indeed, diversity as a performance goal is not expressed in too much detail either in the Act on YLE (Laki Yleisradio Oy:stä, 1993) or the Act on Television and Radio Broadcasting (Laki televisio-ja radiotoiminnasta, 1998). The law stipulates that YLE provide 'a wide variety of information, opinions and debates on social issues, also for minorities and special groups' (Laki Yleisradio Oy:stä, 1993: section 7). As for commercial broadcasters, the law states that when granting licences the government should aim at 'promoting freedom of speech and increasing the diversity of programming' (Laki televisio-ja radiotoiminnasta, 1998: section 10). The operating licences of MTV Finland and Channel Four Finland, too, rely on a general wording, only requiring 'versatile programmes of a high standard, useful information and news, as well as appropriate entertainment' (Liikenneministeriö, 1999) .
Analysis of the recent policy documents suggests that, in Finland, regulations concerning programme diversity are indistinct. Diversity is not given any unambiguous definition but, instead, it is taken as a general performance goal that appears to cover several dimensions of diversity, from reflection of society to various audience interests and a wide range of programme types. Instead of detailed stipulations of programming, the focus is on the structural approach, i.e. on the regulation of entry to the market. Diversity is best promoted, the rationale goes, by granting broadcasting licences to appropriate firms only. In other words, if industry structure is kept viable and competition moderate, programme diversity follows as a byproduct.
Increased Competition and Programme Diversity
In terms of pure figures, Finland obviously is not among the most competitive television marketplaces in Europe. Two public channels competing with two commercial ones appears moderate in an affluent country with 5.2 million inhabitants, compared to the neighbouring Sweden with two public and five commercial channels, or the Netherlands with three public and no fewer than eight private channels (Brants and De Bens, 2000) . Audience shares show that YLE is still the market leader, achieving a share of 46 percent on its two channels in 2002, while MTV3 accounts for 37 percent and Nelonen 12 percent (Finnpanel, 2003) .
Of the five new digital terrestrial television channels introduced in August (Aslama and Wallenius, 2003; Statistics Finland, 2002) . Investments required by digitalization brought further financial problems to all firms (Brown, 2003) . Although industry structure remained largely unchanged, competition for advertisers, sponsors, programming rights and viewing shares has intensified fiercely, particularly after the launch of Nelonen (Hujanen, 2002) .
According to Hellman and Sauri (1994) , between 1980 and 1992 the traditional duopoly of YLE and MTV, with its coordinated division of labour, supplied an extremely varied programme output, thus proving the benefits of strict structural regulation. Studying the immediate outcomes of the reregulation of television broadcasting before the launch of Nelonen, Hellman (1999) found that horizontal diversity across channels suffered slightly due to increased competition although MTV3 improved its channel diversity significantly. At the same time, differences between the channels increased, suggesting that instead of excessive sameness the competing channels chose differentiation, thus proving market-entry regulation beneficial to the viewer. A more recent study by Hujanen (2002) discovered strong indications of more aggressive and competitive scheduling.
Study Design
Programming Data
If the past decade has brought about major changes in industry structure and broadcasting policy, what has occurred regarding the actual television programme supply? The data for the empirical analysis of programming are drawn from two different studies. The programme information for the years 1993-6 is drawn from Hellman's (1999) study, and the figures for the years 1997-2002 from annual surveys on television programming commissioned by the Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications Karlsson, 2001, 2002; Aslama and Wallenius, 2003) .
The data were homogenized and recoded by using a 13-category classification: (1) news, (2) current affairs, (3) information and documentary, (4) cultural programming, (5) personal interest programme, (6) sports, (7) domestic fiction, (8) foreign fiction, (9) movie, (10) children's programme, (11) education, (12) entertainment and (13) other programmes. The unit of analysis was the individual programme, each of which was measured by its length. 3 The data covered altogether 58 sample weeks and more than 37,000 programmes.
Measures of Diversity and Competition
As explained earlier, we use two different indices of programme-type diversity, one measuring the breadth of programming and the other indicating the difference between the channels. According to Hellman (2001) , these measures, called here diversity and dissimilarity, respectively, represent different dimensions of programme-type variety. As the former refers to the probability of seeing different programme types on a channel, the latter measures the probability of seeing different programme types when switching from one channel to another. Also, diversity and dissimilarity are measured both vertically, i.e. within channel or between channels, and horizontally, i.e. across all channels.
Breadth is measured by the Relative Entropy Index (H), which expresses how varied and balanced the programme output is on a channel, i.e. vertically (channel diversity). When calculated as a summary measure of the overall programme output across channels, it serves as a horizontal measure (system diversity). The higher the figure, the higher the diversity for the viewer. The measure has been used previously in similar studies by, for example, Wakshlag and Adams (1985) , Ishikawa et al. (1996) , Litman and Hasegawa (1996) , Hillve et al. (1997) , van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg (2001) and Hellman (2001) . Relative entropy H varies between 0 and 1, with 0 expressing minimum diversity (all content in one category) and 1 expressing maximum diversity (all categories equally large). Due to the logarithmic character of the measure, the closer we come to the maximum score, the more difficult it becomes to increase its value (Hellman, 2001; Kambara, 1992) .
Difference between the channels is measured by the Dissimilarity Index (D), which indicates how much the content of one network, in terms of programme types represented in its schedule, deviates from the content of another (channel dissimilarity). By calculating the average dissimilarity per year, the index serves as a horizontal measure of difference across channels (system dissimilarity). This measure has previously been used by Hellman and Sauri (1994) and Hellman (2001) , 4 whereas Dominick and Pearce (1976) and Dimmick and McDonald (2001) utilized it as a horizontal measure that summed up the differences across all channels, and called it 'homogenization'. We prefer the term 'dissimilarity', since high values of the index signify low homogeneity, or great difference between the channels.
For analytic purposes, competition intensity was also measured by using the standard Herfindal-Hirschmann Index (HHI), calculated as a sum of squares of the market share of each broadcaster. This measure, or its versions, are commonly used in the economic analysis of industry structure and market concentration (see for example, Albarran, 2002; McDonald and Dimmick, 2003; van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg, 2001 ). The maximum value of the index is 1 and minimum value 0, with the maximum indicating a monopoly and the minimum indicating a perfect, and fierce, competition.
The mathematical details of the three indices are presented in the Appendix.
Research Questions
Our main research question is whether the diversity of programming in Finland increased or decreased between 1993 and 2002. Shifts in programme-type diversity are analysed both in terms of breadth of programming and difference between channels. Second, we ask in which way reregulation of broadcasting and intensified competition since 1993 might be related to the shifts in diversity.
On basis of the preceding discussion, we expect to find two periods with two different structural conditions and performance of diversity. The years 1993-6 should represent a period of low intensity of competition with high programme-type diversity scores, whereas the years 1997-2002 are expected to show a fiercer rivalry between the broadcasters with declining indices of diversity. Strict regulation of entry to the market is expected to have kept programming relatively diverse through the period of analysis but intensified rivalry after the launch of Nelonen in 1997 should have caused a declining trend in diversity figures and decreased the differences between the channels with each providing more of the same.
In theory, high system dissimilarity should coincide with high system diversity, whereas the more the channels resemble each other, the less diverse the programme content (Dimmick and McDonald, 2001) . However, this is not necessarily the case, since structural conditions of the marketplace and strategic choices of the companies may intervene. If channels choose to duplicate each other (low channel dissimilarity) with a wide range of programme types (high channel diversity), they provide high system diversity. If, on the other hand, competition is fierce, they may choose to imitate each other (low channel dissimilarity) by concentrating on a narrow choice of popular programme types (low channel diversity), thus resulting in low system diversity. Similarly, a broad variety at system level may be a result of a group of narrow channels (low channel diversity) collectively, through a process of counter-programming (high channel dissimilarity), complementing each other effectively (Litman and Hasegawa, 1996) . In other words, breadth of programming and differences between the channels are not linearly related but represent different dimensions of programme-type diversity (Hellman, 2001 ).
Here we expect competition intensity to intervene, as suggested by van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg (2001). Whereas moderate competition (high HHI) should promote diversity and dissimilarity between channels, ruinous competition (low HHI) should have a negative effect on both. In other words, if diversity of programming has decreased due to the entry of Nelonen, indicating a fiercer competition, dissimilarity index values, too, should show a declining trend with the four channels tending to provide more of the same.
Results
Channel and System Diversity
We computed the values of relative entropy index for 1993-2002. As Figure 1 indicates, there is a slight downward trend in diversity figures, which coincides with the commencement of Nelonen. The average system diversity for 1993-6 is .94 while for 1997-2002 the average score is not more than .90.
Although its variety of programming narrowed slightly during the period of analysis, YLE1 still provided the highest channel diversity with an average value of .91. Second highest scores were displayed by YLE2, on average .88, while MTV3 reached the average score of .83, and Nelonen .75. On the basis of earlier experience with the measure (see Hellman, 2001; Hillve et al., 1997) , the index figures show that over the research period each channel, with the exception of Nelonen, provided a very wide and balanced variety of offerings to their viewers.
Following its long tradition of broad programme offerings (Hellman, 1999; Hellman and Sauri, 1994) , the public broadcaster YLE is still ahead of its commercial rivals in Finland, offering a more diverse choice of programme types. However, both YLE channels, as well as MTV3, have marginally narrowed their supply since the entry of Nelonen. The last three years in the study period, in particular, show a modest, yet clear decline in the diversity of MTV3's offerings. Nelonen, then, seemed to decrease its diversity during its first six years of operation instead of challenging the established broadcasters with a wide range of choice. In 2002, both commercial channels offered the narrowest programme supply in the history of their existence.
The clear downward trend in system diversity after 1997 suggests that, as expected, intensifying competition due to the new entrant had a negative effect on both channel diversity and system diversity. The fact that, since 1997, system diversity suffered more than respective channel diversity scores may be caused by Nelonen with its great concentration on foreign fiction. While devoting a major share, 44 percent in 2002, of its programming time to foreign series and serials, the channel tends to bias the overall programme System diversity structure of the four-channel system, thus causing a decline in system diversity scores.
Channel and System Dissimilarity
The values of the dissimilarity index, presented in Table 1 , indicate that, contrary to expectation, the entry of Nelonen encouraged differentiation between the channels rather than decreased differences in the programme structures of the four channels. The average dissimilarity across channels for 1993-6 was .62, whereas for 1997-2002 the average score of the system dissimilarity index was .70.
Although still closely related to each other, with an average dissimilarity score of .61, YLE's two channels differentiated their offerings during the research period and, in particular, after the entry of Nelonen. The main distinction between the networks lies in their programming domains, with YLE1 focusing on news, current affairs programmes and education, and YLE2 on sports, fiction and entertainment. These domains have been gradually developing since the early 1990s (Hellman, 1999) , and have recently been documented in the 'channel commissions' designed by YLE in 2001 (Hujanen, 2002) . 5 The relatively low dissimilarity, on average .55, between MTV3 and Nelonen indicates that, to some degree, the channels provide similar fares. During the last three years, in particular, an emerging tendency towards excessive sameness could be discerned. On the other hand, the annual dissimilarity scores between them varied greatly, suggesting that the two commercial channels were 'testing' the right recipe to meet each other's challenge.
Interestingly, YLE2 also closely resembled both MTV3 and Nelonen (with average dissimilarity scores of .61 and .66, respectively), indicating its role as the YLE 'entertainment network'. Still, YLE2 does not imitate its commercial competitors but positions itself in between YLE1 and MTV3, as on average it differed equally much from these two channels. Also, the analysis of dissimilarity between YLE's networks and the commercial channels shows a growing trend rather than a declining one, suggesting that no convergence between the public and private sector occurred. The highest dissimilarity values, on average .98, were found between YLE1 and Nelonen that seem to represent two distinctly different ends of a channel profile.
Relationships between the Measures
We also calculated the correlations between the three measures, the relative entropy index, dissimilarity index, indicating diversity, and HHI, indicating the intensity of competition. 6 Our assumption was that the three measures, market concentration, system diversity and system dissimilarity, are not linearly related, but that while regulated and moderate competition should encourage both diversity and dissimilarity, ruinous competition should have a negative effect on both. Table 2 shows that there is a strong correlation between market concentration and system diversity (.688), suggesting that the fiercer the competition, or the lower the HHI score, the lower the diversity across the channels. Also, there is a strong negative correlation between market concentration and system dissimilarity (-.701), suggesting that increasing competition (declining HHI) increases rather than decreases average differences between the channels. There is also a low negative correlation between diversity and dissimilarity (-.237), suggesting that the two measures are inversely related and represent two different dimensions of programme-type diversity.
Discussion
Increasing Competition and Programme-Type Diversity
Our purpose was to analyse the relation of intensified competition, caused by the reregulation of broadcasting since 1993, and the diversity of programming in Finland. We expected that due to strict regulation of entry to the market the overall offerings would remain diverse but, at the same time, we expected that the commencement of Nelonen in 1997 would have a negative effect both on channel diversity and system diversity. Similarly, we expected that the new entrant would encourage excessive sameness among the channels, thus causing a negative effect both on channel dissimilarity and on system dissimilarity. Our assumption was that the years 1993-6 represented a period of low intensity of competition, whereas the years 1997-2002 would show indications of a fiercer rivalry between the broadcasters. Indeed, the launch of Nelonen appeared to mark a change in programmetype diversity since both channel diversity and system diversity scores decreased since 1997. This supports the theory according to which intensifying rivalry decreases diversity rather than increases it. Also as we expected, diversity scores were extremely high over the research period, suggesting that the established channels have reached an ideal level of variety at which they find it convenient to compete. At this stage of 'saturation' in the breadth of programme output, neither a single channel nor a channel system is able to increase it anymore.
Contrary to expectation, we found no indications of excessive sameness between the channels. Quite the opposite, dissimilarity scores showed an increasing trend since the commencement of Nelonen, indicating that the new entrant encouraged difference between the channels rather than decreased it. This appears to give support to an opposite theory about the relationship of competition and diversity, i.e. the one claiming that growing competition increases programme-type diversity. In terms of dissimilarity scores, YLE's two System diversity 1 -.237 System dissimilarity 1 channels are closely related while MTV3 and Nelonen also show rather similar profiles. Our assumption was that market concentration would not be linearly related to system diversity or system dissimilarity. However, we found a strong correlation between increasing competition and decreasing system diversity, which we interpret to indicate a shift in the intensity of competition in the Finnish broadcasting market. Our conclusion is that at this stage of competition, i.e. with four rival nationwide channels, system diversity begins to suffer. On the other hand, we discovered a strong correlation between increasing competition and increasing system dissimilarity, suggesting that in spite of intensifying rivalry, competition was moderate enough to prevent too close a similarity between the channels.
We conclude that the 'conjectures' of competition favoured decreasing diversity, but increasing dissimilarity, which indicates that diversity reacts 'negatively' to competitive challenges more easily than dissimilarity. At this stage of competition, differentiation between channels still pays, whereas diversity appears to narrow slightly. Also, at this stage of competition diversity and dissimilarity are not strongly related. If the competition were fiercer, we might expect a stronger association between the two measures.
Moderate Policies and Open Diversity
Interestingly, our results point towards a conclusion suggested by van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg (2001) , who argue that competition and diversity are not linearly related. Moderate competition, they claim, tends to encourage diversity, whereas ruinous competition, with too many firms of equal size rivalling one another in a stagnant market, and too many new firms with different backgrounds entering the scene, leads to declining diversity and excessive sameness in offerings. 'Under conditions that favor moderate competition diversity is strongly related to competitive conduct. The less intense competitive conduct is, the more broadcasters' strategy will vary, and the more "open" diversity will be, and vice versa', they claim (van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg, 2001: 225) .
Based on this argument, they suggest three policy implications (van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg, 2001: 228-9):
1. Media competition policy should aim for moderate competition; 2. Moderate competition can be stimulated by shaping the appropriate structural conditions; and 3. Market-entry regulation should be a part of this kind of policy.
Our analysis of Finland's broadcasting policy shows that instead of behavioural regulation stating direct programming goals regarding diversity, it depended on structural regulation that made an indirect impact on programming. A major element of these policies was the careful consideration on the market-entry aspects, as was shown both in the case of TV3 in 1986, TV4 in 1997 and with the new digital channels in 1999. By allowing no more than two commercial channels and, then, by restricting the commencement of advertising-sponsored digital channels, the government appears to have protected both YLE and the incumbent commercial broadcasters, thus trying to keep the competition within industry moderate (see also Brown, 2003) .
So far, the performance of the channel system could be assessed to be beneficial to the viewer. Although all of the five new digital channels, except for the Swedish-speaking YLE-FST, represent target-group programming, or 'narrowcasting', together they offer a programme profile that greatly resembles the system-wide supply of the four analogue, full-service channels (Aslama and Wallenius, 2003) , Through counter-programming, the digital channels even manage to effect an increase (although a marginal one) in system diversity. As is shown in Figure 2 , the diversity index score in 2002 was .90 without the digital channels, and .91 with the digital channels included. Due to their specialized and differing profiles, the digital channels also make a positive effect on system dissimilarity. In 2002, the dissimilarity index score was .75 when digital channels were excluded but 1.11 when included.
Can we conclude, then, whether, how and to what extent regulation matters? In the Finnish case, it could indeed be argued that the 'moderate' policy-making of the past decade (as opposed to tight regulation or complete liberalization of the markets) has for its part been paramount in creating conditions for moderate competition. As could be empirically proven, this has ensured a smooth transition from the public service dominated two-channel system to the new competitive market situation of two public service and two commercial nationwide channels, plus the five new digital terrestrial channels. Thus, it can be said that the case of Finnish television 1993-2002 is an example par excellence to support the conclusions of van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg 
